During our first quarter portfolio update, we profiled portfolio holding, IDEX Corp. (IEX). Below is a replay of our live commentary on the company from our quarterly portfolio update WEBINAR and an excerpt from our QUARTERLY LETTER.

IDEX Corp: One of Ensemble’s newer positions is IDEX Corporation. IDEX is not a well-known company, and we believe it has the chance to be recognized as one of the next great serial acquirers like past Ensemble holdings TransDigm Group (TDG) and Heico (HEI).

One of the reasons IDEX is not well-known is because it sells decidedly mundane products, under many different brand names – mostly to distributors and other product manufacturers. It is highly diversified and owns over 50 subsidiary companies; these businesses typically sell niche parts and technology that help larger systems run smoothly in industrial and healthcare end-markets.

One of IDEX’s products is its Systec OEM MINI Degassing module. This module removes gases from fluids and can improve the accuracy of liquid chromatography equipment used to analyze the chemical composition of drugs in the pharma industry, for example. It is sold within IDEX’s Health and Science Technologies (HST) segment, 40% of revenue. Another is its Sandpiper Heavy Duty Flap Valve Pump sold by its Warren Rupp business, counted within its Fluid and Metering Technologies (FMT) segment, 38% of revenue. The pump can be used in a larger Dissolved Air Floatation system that factories use to treat industrial wastewater. Its StreamMaster Fire Monitor is installed on fire trucks and used as a water cannon to extinguish fires. It is sold by the Akron Brass business within IDEX’s Fire and Safety / Diversified Products (FSDP) segment that is 22% of revenue. Flashy Ferraris these are not.

IDEX has been acquiring businesses that sell niche products like these for over three decades. In the last two calendar years, five acquisitions totaled over $1.2 billion. But why would we want to own a company that does so many acquisitions, when acquisitions so often fail, and for so many reasons? Roger L. Martin estimated in his 2016 Harvard Business Review article that “M&A is a mug’s game, in which typically 70-90% of acquisitions are abysmal failures.” Some famous M&A failures include AOL’s $165 billion combination with Time Warner, Daimler-Benz’s $37 billion deal with Chrysler, and Sprint’s doomed $35 billion merger with Nextel.

There are many ways for an acquisition to fail, among them for an acquirer to overestimate strategic fit, to overpay, and to not recognize conflicts in business cultures or technologies. We believe, however, that IDEX is among a class of companies that can outperform via acquisitions, because acquisitions are its bread-and-butter. As opposed to an online service provider like AOL or a car company like Daimler-Benz overestimating the synergies of one big tie-up, acquisitions are what IDEX specializes in. Serial acquirers can be similar to great equity investors who have a disciplined process of buying good businesses at reasonable prices and do so repeatedly and at growing scale over time, much like Ensemble aims to do.

A strategy of serial acquisitions can compound above-average returns for decades if done right. Examples of successful serial acquirers include Constellation Software (CSU), TransDigm (TDG), Heico (HEI), Danaher (DHR) and Illinois Tool Works (ITW), all of which have outperformed the S&P 500 over the last 15 years.

IDEX’s stock has outperformed as well, with a 15% annualized total return since its IPO in 1989, about 4.5% above the S&P 500’s return over the same period.

IDEX’s path to its IPO started 10 years prior in 1979 as the first major leveraged buyout (LBO) by famed private equity firm KKR. At the time it was a 50-year-old auto parts company called Houdaille Industries. Houdaille was taken over by the British-based TI Group PLC, which spun off several businesses it didn’t want into an entity that was again LBO’d by KKR in 1988. The resulting company was named IDEX – an acronym for Innovation, Diversity and Excellence, headquartered in the Chicago area. The LBO left IDEX with a pile of debt to pay off; according to Donald Boyce, the first CEO of IDEX, “It made us focus on cashflow.” Since 1990, IDEX’s operating cash flow has grown at a double-digit pace of 11% annualized, according to data from Bloomberg.

We attribute IDEX’s success to three things: Its 1. Discipline 2. De-centralization and 3. Scale.

IDEX is disciplined in the types of investments it targets and in its financial management. IDEX generally acquires businesses that have #1 or #2 share in small, fragmented markets uninteresting to larger competitors. The businesses IDEX acquires typically sell components or technology that are small portions of the overall cost of their customers’ systems, but that also must be counted on to work. For example, its BAND-IT fasteners, such as steel bands and clamps, are used to hold together objects on everything from ships to aircraft where the cost of failure could be disastrous. These types of parts, once trusted to work and to be supplied quickly and reliably, create a switching cost for customers who don’t want the risk or inconvenience of designing such a part out. This gives IDEX pricing power with its customers.

Management also has a minimum financial return it expects to achieve on its capital invested by year five after an acquisition, and regularly passes on deals that are too expensive. There is a minimum incremental EBITDA margin target of 25% for IDEX that discourages a lot of dilutive acquisitions, and it aims to consistently pay out 30-35% of its net income in dividends.

A second key aspect to IDEX’s success is its decentralization. Unlike the rationale for most acquisitions talked about in the press, IDEX does not expect much synergy between its businesses. While IDEX does buy businesses in certain areas it calls its “business platforms” — such as pumps, valves, water, scientific fluidics & optics, and fire & safety, these businesses are not usually integrated with each other. IDEX gives its general managers performance targets specific to their business and enough leeway to empower them to achieve its goals. It is the antidote to micromanagement.

Lastly, we believe IDEX is successful because it operates at a scale that’s differentiated. It has gained talent, experience, and capital the last 35 years. Acquisitions have been part of IDEX’s DNA from the beginning, having got its start as a collection of businesses spun off from private equity firm KKR; KKR’s co-founder Henry Kravis served on IDEX’s board for the first 14 years (1988-2002.) In the last several years, IDEX has built up a team that specializes in sourcing deals for each of its segments, and in greenfield areas.

The company has also been influenced by the culture of Danaher, another successful serial acquirer whose stock price has returned almost 20% annualized the past 15 years. The past three CEOs of IDEX have been Danaher alums, including current CEO Eric Ashleman and the previous CEO Andrew Silvernail who adopted the “IDEX Difference” that is similar in concept to the Danaher Business System (DBS.) Danaher calls DBS a process for continuous improvement, lean manufacturing, and innovation. The IDEX Difference[…]

During our first quarter portfolio update, we profiled portfolio holding, Ferrari (RACE). Below is a replay of our live commentary on the company from our quarterly portfolio update WEBINAR and an excerpt from our QUARTERLY LETTER.

Ferrari N.V.: Ferrari has had a very successful run since we first bought shares in the company in 2017. It has been one of our most successful investments since, with shares rising over five times, and understandably so given how phenomenal this business is and how well it has been managed.

Initially spun out of Fiat (now Stellantis) in 2015, it was a rare jewel within the parent company, where its value was hidden among more standard and premium cars sold under brands such as Fiat, Alpha Romeo, Maserati, Chrysler, Jeep, and others. Under the leadership of the astute business manager Sergio Marchionne, who had run Fiat since 2004, Ferrari came to be recognized as the undervalued and unique asset that it was within its parent.

It was being run below its potential, perhaps because of over-conservatism in reverence to its legacy – a legacy of offering products that were highly desired by many and undersupplied to only a limited set of privileged customers, who built up their relationship with Ferrari buying nearly two-thirds of its annual output. This allowed them to continue getting access to the most desirable, collectible models Ferrari built in the future.

“Build one less car than the market demand” is a quote attributed to founder Enzo Ferrari, yet where that line stands is more art than science. Conservatism on the supply/demand balance is generally a healthy strategy in protecting the value and exclusivity of the brand. But being too conservative results in too much unrealized value left on the table.

After the company went public in 2015, it reported revenue of just under €3 billion for the year while shipping less than 8,000 cars at an average selling price (ASP) of €270,000 per car. EBITDA margins were 25%. Importantly, by our calculation, its return on invested capital (ROIC) was over 100%.

Ferrari was demonstrating economics more in line with digital and luxury businesses and deserving of a much higher valuation, more like a Hermes or Apple, rather than a typical auto company.

In 2024, the company expects to generate over €6.7 billion in revenue in 2024 with EBITDA margins exceeding 38%. We expect over 14,000 cars to be shipped with an ASP over €400,000 – that is an ASP increase of €100,000 over the past 5 years!
There were two important things we recognized that the market did not appear to fully back in 2017 that made this an attractive investment for us.

When we did our first deep dive into the business in 2016, we estimated there were 2-3 million potential high net worth customers who could afford to buy a Ferrari. Consequently, selling less than 8,000 cars meant a customer capture percentage of less than 0.1% in any given year. Even this year, when the company will likely sell 14,000 cars, we believe it is still selling to less than 0.1% of its potential market. That seemed a very conservative ratio, albeit limited by the appeal of its 2-door, 2-seat ultra-high performance sports car form factor. But we came to believe that Ferrari could increase its appeal to a broader set of customers (increase demand) by widening its form factors to 4-door cars and SUVs.

In addition, its ASP had only risen at a slightly higher than inflation rate of 4% per year over the prior decade. And the company had long wait lists at those prices that sometimes surpassed 18 months. Meanwhile, the wealth of customers in this segment grows at something like 5-10% per year from returns on their assets and businesses.

We realized there was a growing gap between the wealth of their customer base and the pricing that Ferrari captured. For a material proportion of the customer base, Ferrari’s appeal as a Veblen good, means that the more people who could afford one, the less desirable the product because its value comes from its differentiation from the ordinary. A Veblen good is one where demand increases with price precisely because they are so hard or expensive to attain.

Ferrari’s current CEO Benedetto Vigna has succinctly described Veblen good’s relevance to Ferrari saying:
“The client is giving a value to our cars because they are unique, because they are limited, because they are exclusive. We could make more, but that does not make sense. We will offend our clients.”

Our view was that Ferrari would be required to raise prices at a rate that kept pace with their customers’ wealth to continue delivering to customers the Veblen expectations of the product, with shareholders disproportionately benefiting from the increased pricing growth.

It was clear to us that there was a large gap between market expectations priced into Ferrari’s stock and the higher fair value implied by our analysis. Interestingly the large gap persisted for years even after Ferrari began to confirm our thesis when it revealed its 2022 financial targets at the 2018 Investor meeting.

Under Sergio Marchionne, Ferrari began to push the envelope on volumes but in an intelligent manner that included leveraging its core assets to build new form factors that would expand the appeal of its cars to new customers. For example, the Ferrari Roma has been a much bigger hit with women than the traditional style of the 488, F8, or 812. The recently launched Purosangue appears to have every sign of success with those that might have the means to buy a Ferrari but would rather it come with the utility of four doors that can also bring three passengers and some gear along for a weekend.

Ferrari also rolled out the SF90 and 296 GTB/GTS plug-in hybrid models that appealed to a younger segment of its market while making strides towards the global trend of cleaner emissions, but without sacrificing the performance and driving dynamics of Ferrari. These hybrids are likely to also do well in the Chinese market over time, a large fast-growing market for high net worth (HNW) individuals.

These new form factors have increased the appeal of Ferrari across new HNW customer segments without necessarily oversupplying Ferraris within each model line thereby preserving its exclusivity. We see evidence of this from the fact that nearly all models are sold out through 2025 with average selling prices approaching a record €400,000.

This also confirms our initial thesis that Ferrari’s customers would accept higher prices while driving margins and profits benefiting shareholders.

With the launch of the Icona design-oriented collector cars such as the SP1, SP2 and SP3, Ferrari was able to effectively sell high value limited cars more often per decade than when it was strictly reserved for hypercars like the LaFerrari, the Enzo, or the F40. These cars sold for more than €1MM, while the SP3 now surpasses €2MM.

Ferrari also opened up the €500,000+ pricing tier with its higher priced SF90 and Purosangue for the normal production, non-collector cars, which sell in higher volumes further supporting the brand’s higher[…]

During our first quarter 2024 portfolio update, Ensemble Capital’s Chief Investment Officer Sean Stannard-Stockton, and Senior Investment Analysts Arif Karim and Eileen Segall discuss current market and economic conditions as well as Ferrari (RACE), IDEX Corp. (IEX), & Perimeter Solutions (PRM). There’s a Q&A with the team at the end of the presentation.

Below is a replay of the full webinar as well as a link to Ensemble Capital’s QUARTERLY LETTER.

Each quarter, Ensemble Capital hosts a webinar to discuss the current market, economic conditions, as well as a few of our portfolio holdings. This quarter, we’ll be discussing our investments in Ferrari (RACE) and IDEX (IEX)

The event will use a webinar format. Participants will have a chance to ask live questions of the research team during the Q&A portion of the event.

This quarter’s webinar will be held on Monday, April 8 at 1:30 pm (PST)

We’d love for you to join us, which you can do by REGISTERING HERE.

If you’d like to listen to our previously-held quarterly updates, an archive can be FOUND HERE.

We hope to see you there!

Netflix: During our fourth quarter portfolio update, we profiled portfolio holding, Netflix, Inc (NFLX). Below is a replay of our live commentary on the company from our quarterly portfolio update WEBINAR and an excerpt from our QUARTERLY LETTER.

We last discussed Netflix three years ago. At that time, five months into the COVID pandemic shutdowns in 2020, Netflix had added 26 million new subscribers to its service and went on to add 10 million more for a total of 36 million, ending the year with 204 million subscribers. Then in 2021, the company added 18 million subscribers culminating with 8 million new subscribers added in 4Q 2021, aided by the global success of the Korean produced show Squid Game.

The share price hit a record high of $687 in November 2021 before commencing a steep decline in December and January, presaging a significant reversal in its fortunes. Subscriber losses of 200,000 and 1 million in Q1 and Q2 of 2022, the first such net subscriber loss in Netflix’s history, caused shares to fall 75% from the November 2021 peak to its bottom six months later. As it turned out, through all of 2022, Netflix grew subscribers by 9 million or 4%, a big drop compared to the 20% average growth over the previous five years, but less than the worst fears.

Inflation had taken off in 2021 causing central banks around the world to pivot their view of it being a transitory phenomenon into a more ingrained process. Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 further pressuring energy and food prices globally. The ensuing aggressive increase in interest rates led to a recalibration in liquidity and market multiples, with those companies that missed expectation punished even harder. From peak to trough, Netflix went from a market capitalization of $300 billion to just $75 billion.

Netflix’s gross subscriber adds, i.e., the number of new subscribers signing up for the service, stalled in all geographies in a manner that even the management team seemed at a loss to explain. The market narrative shifted, and with it future financial expectations, from a company with a seemingly unstoppable business model accelerated by the COVID pandemic to one that had saturated its market and succumbed to burgeoning streaming competition from legacy media companies.

From our perspective having a major war break out in Europe’s borders and another major global economic shock so soon after the COVID shock seemed the most likely explanation for why people abruptly paused in signing up for a new Netflix subscription en masse. We had seen regional changes in new sign-ups historically when people’s attention had been drawn to certain events like the World Cup or the Olympics, only to see additions rebound in subsequent quarters, but we had not seen a globally synchronized pause before.

This was the second time in Netflix’s history as a public company that it had faced a crisis of confidence among investors, where management’s ability to adapt was tested. It had faced a similar test when it pivoted its business model from a very profitable DVD by mail service into a money losing streaming service back in 2011, resulting in a similar fall in its share price before regaining investor trust over the next 2 years and increasing its value over 10x thereafter.

This time it was the inexplicable stall in subscriber growth that led the company to pivot its business model from a pure subscription video service into one that incorporated both advertising as a new revenue source and monetizing the 100 million engaged viewers that were borrowing someone else’s password by implementing tighter password security. This complimentary approach of tightening user password sharing and offering a new lower priced, economically accretive ad-supported plan (or additional add-on subscriber fee) opened up a large pool of already engaged users to reenergize revenue and profit growth rather than solely depending on new to Netflix sign-ups.

This effectively multiplies the total available market (TAM) for Netflix over a subscription-only model, while also raising the ultimate pricing umbrella for the service over time. For context, US TV advertising revenue was about $67 billion in 2022 compared to Pay TV subscription revenue of $86 billion. This amounts to advertising increasing the total revenue from TV content by 80% over subscription rates alone.

Furthermore, Netflix continued investment in its nascent games business, which has the potential to expand the TAM even more. Globally, gaming is a $213 billion market. The net result of all of these service extensions multiplies Netflix’s monetization value for each subscriber dramatically, especially as the adjacent services revolve around the same end user and complement one another.

One other pivot by management was on capital allocation in relation to content. Netflix’s strategy on content spending had been to “overinvest” in content in order to grow the scale of its catalog ahead of subscribers along two vectors – category expansion and geographic expansion. This in turn drove new subscriber additions in existing and new geographic markets. With subscriber growth slowing drastically under indefinite macro-geopolitical circumstances, management rationally adapted and reprioritized the scale of that investment. The result is faster growth in free cashflow generation, now on track to surpass $6 billion this year.

With Netflix letting its foot off the content pedal for the first time in a decade, we fully expected competing streaming services to see blood in the water and get more aggressive. While we did not believe that competition was a factor in the subscriber growth slowdown as the common narrative believed, we did assume that scaling competitors like Disney (whose courage and humility in copying the Netflix growth strategy we were impressed by) or Warner Bros Discovery could get more aggressive and use the content growth strategy to win a greater share of new streaming subscribers, eventually eroding some of Netflix’s scale dependent competitive advantage.

To our surprise, both companies announced their own cutbacks in content spending and increased prices aggressively for their own streaming services, finally finding the breathing room Netflix’ reduced aggressiveness allowed to improve the profitability of their own money losing streaming services rather than trying to take share from Netflix.

This was great news to us as investors as it allowed Netflix to become less aggressive on its content growth strategy, drive higher positive free cash flow, while retaining its relative moat advantage as it adapted its business model. The company has been clear that as revenue reaccelerates to its goal of double-digit growth, it will become more aggressive again in content investment to drive further subscriber gains, to the extent it’s justified.

In retrospect, Disney and Warner Brother Discovery’s reactions made sense given their financial circumstances of high debt loads and weakening linear TV revenue, traditional media’s cash cow. US Cable TV subscribers, the main source of their linear TV subscription and advertising revenue, has seen its subscriber defections accelerating to a record pace of -7% as of 3Q 2023.

Despite Netflix’s nickname from only a couple of years ago being “Debtflix” as it took advantage of low-cost debt to “overinvest” in scaling its own content catalog, it never put itself in a position where[…]